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Faith Brozovich and Ian H. Gotlib
Stanford University
The authors examined intentional forgetting of negative material in depression. Participants were
instructed to not think about emotional nouns that they had learned to associate with a neutral cue word.
The authors provided participants with multiple occasions to suppress the unwanted words. Overall,
depressed participants successfully forgot negative words. Moreover, the authors obtained a clear
practice effect. However, forgetting came at a cost: Compared with the nondepressed participants and
with the depressed participants who were instructed to forget positive words, depressed participants who
were instructed to forget negative words showed significantly worse recall of the baseline words. These
results indicate that training depressed individuals in intentional forgetting could prove to be an effective
strategy to counteract automatic ruminative tendencies and mood-congruent biases.
Keywords: intentional forgetting, rumination, depression memory, bias
One of the more troubling aspects of depression is the frequent
occurrence of unintentional and often uncontrollable negative
thoughts and memories. Not only are these negative cognitions a
debilitating symptom of depression, but they are also related to
both the maintenance of depressive episodes and the likelihood of
recurrence (e.g., Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; Nolen-Hoeksema & Lar-
son, 1999; Roberts, Gilboa, & Gotlib, 1998). Therefore, gaining a
better understanding of conditions that might decrease the occur-
rence of negative thoughts and memories in depressed individuals
is an important first step in the development of effective methods
of remediation.
One of the most consistent and robust findings of the numerous
investigations of memory processes associated with depression is
that depressed participants are characterized by a mood-congruent
recall bias, recalling more negative than positive words on explicit
memory tasks (Matt, Vazquez, & Campbell, 1992). In these stud-
ies, depressed individuals are typically asked to learn a list of
words or to judge words in terms of self-relevance and then to
recall these words. In attempting to understand the reason for the
depression-associated preferential recall of negative material in
these studies, cognitive theorists have suggested that depressed
individuals engage in strategic elaboration of negative information
(Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1997). Increased elabo-
ration of negative material, either during or following the initial
encoding phase, increases the subsequent accessibility and ease of
retrieval of negative concepts. Empirical support for this explana-
tion comes from a related line of research demonstrating that
depression is associated with a tendency to respond to negative life
events and negative mood states by ruminating about the event or
mood (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993; Nolen-Hoeksema,
2000; Nolen-Hoeksema, Morrow, & Fredrickson, 1993). Like
elaboration, rumination makes negative events and memories more
accessible and more likely to be easily retrieved, resulting in a
vicious circle of rumination, mood-congruent recall, and depressed
mood state (Lyubomirsky, Caldwell, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998).
Although depressed and nondepressed individuals appear to
differ in their habitual processing of negative material, it is not
clear that they would differ in their ability to intentionally forget
this material. Indeed, in contrast to nondepressed persons, de-
pressed individuals typically make little effort to suppress and
forget negative thoughts (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema,
1993). It is possible, however, that with guided and repeated
attempts to forget negative material, depressed persons could re-
duce elaborative processing and, consequently, negative recall. It
is important to note that studies examining free recall and recog-
nition by depressed persons of experimentally presented valenced
stimuli are assessing passive forgetting; participants in these ex-
periments are not instructed to forget or suppress material. How-
ever, forgetting can also take the form of an active process that is
deliberately instigated (Levy & Anderson, 2002). In addition,
intentional forgetting, when applied to negative material, could
develop into a powerful emotion-regulation strategy. Indeed, stud-
ies of emotion regulation in older participants have consistently
reported that forgetting the bad times and remembering the good
times are strongly associated with well being and overall life
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satisfaction (Charles, Mather, & Carstensen, 2003; Kennedy,
Mather, & Carstensen, 2004). Few studies have investigated the
consequences of intentional forgetting on the recall of negative
material in depression. We designed the present investigation to
examine whether training depressed participants in suppression
and giving them explicit instructions to forget facilitated their
forgetting of negative material; if so, the results of this study might
contribute ultimately to the development of an effective method of
remediation.
A small number of studies have used a “directed forgetting” task
to examine individual differences in instructed forgetting (e.g.,
Korfine & Hooley, 2000; Tolin, Hamlin, & Foa, 2002). Of these,
in only one study did the authors examine intentional forgetting by
participants diagnosed with major depressive disorder. Power,
Dalgleish, Claudio, Tata, and Kentish (2000) used a directed
forgetting paradigm in which, halfway through the learning phase,
depressed and nondepressed participants were instructed to forget
the words they had learned so far. When participants were tested
on their final recall for words from both halves of the list, only the
depressed participants showed better memory for the to-be-
forgotten negative than for the to-be-forgotten positive words in
the first half of the list. Although these findings suggest that
depression is associated with impaired intentional forgetting of
negative material, it is important to note that the degree to which
this paradigm represents intentional forgetting is questionable.
Participants were instructed to forget, but the instruction occurred
just once, in the absence of cues to remind them about the to-be-
forgotten words, and just prior to the learning of new materials. In
short, the forgetting processes used and assessed in the directed
forgetting paradigm are arguably more passive than active. (For a
related analysis of directed forgetting, see Sahakyan & Kelley,
2002.)
In an important series of studies using primarily nonemotional
material in unselected samples, Anderson and Green (2001) dem-
onstrated that forgetting instructions and training in suppression of
unwanted thoughts can have enduring consequences for subse-
quent recall. In contrast to directed forgetting paradigms, Ander-
son and Green’s “think–no-think” procedure required participants
to practice suppression when faced with multiple occurrences of
the cue that they had learned to associate with the response to be
suppressed. This think–no-think procedure clearly involves active
suppression of material. Anderson and Green found that when
people consistently prevent memories from entering awareness,
the subsequent deliberate recall of the rejected memories becomes
increasingly difficult. Participants in these studies first learned
unrelated word pairs to criterion. In the next phase, the first
member of some pairs were presented as cues for recalling the
second member (respond condition), and the first member of other
pairs served as a cue to stop the second member from coming to
mind (suppress condition). Last, after a varied number of trials in
making responses to some cues and suppressing responses to
others, participants were asked to recall all response words. Using
this think–no-think design, Anderson and Green showed that the
level of recalling previously suppressed words dropped below the
baseline recall of words not cued in the second phase. Moreover,
the greater the number of suppression trials was, the fewer the
words that were recalled on the final test. Therefore, thought
suppression appears to make the subsequent recall of suppressed
thoughts or memories more difficult, at least for the relatively
neutral words used in Anderson and Green’s studies. It is possible
that different results would be obtained with emotional materials
and that such results would depend, in turn, on whether the
research participants are depressed.
Using a variant of Anderson and Green’s (2001) think–no-think
paradigm, Hertel and Gerstle (2003) had dysphoric and nondys-
phoric students learn initially neutral nouns paired with positive or
negative adjectival cues (e.g., gloomy cottage vs. splendid cottage;
slashed skin vs. smooth skin). During the learning phase, partici-
pants were instructed to form a self-referential mental image for
each pair. In the think–no-think phase, the valence of the cue was
counterbalanced with the instruction to respond with or suppress
the corresponding noun. On the final test of cued recall, Hertel and
Gerstle found that dysphoric students recalled more previously
suppressed nouns than did controls, regardless of the valence of the
cue. Although Hertel and Gerstle had predicted that forgetting
would be a function of the valence of the cue, in retrospect the
absence of valence effects is not surprising. Studies using standard
memory paradigms with dysphoric students have yielded incon-
sistent evidence for mood-related biases; instead, dysphoric indi-
viduals tend to show evenhanded recall (Matt et al., 1992). Clin-
ically depressed participants, in contrast, typically produce clear
evidence of memory bias in these standard paradigms and, there-
fore, might show such a bias in intentional forgetting.
The goal of the present study was to use Anderson and Green’s
(2001) think–no-think paradigm to investigate intentional forget-
ting of emotional words in carefully diagnosed, clinically de-
pressed participants. We were interested in examining whether,
after learning a set of cue–response pairs to criterion, subsequent
practice in suppressing the valenced response words would have
consequences for later recall. The main question was whether we
could reduce or eliminate the consistently reported tendency for
depressed participants to recall negative stimuli by giving them
instructions to forget and by giving them practice in suppression.
Specifically, we predicted that depressed participants instructed to
suppress thinking about negative words would not show mood-
congruent recall, but would show reduced retrieval of the negative
words on subsequent testing. If this result is obtained, training in
intentional forgetting could prove to be a useful emotion-
regulation strategy for individuals suffering from depression.
This is the first study using the think–no-think paradigm with
neutral cues and emotional target words to investigate intentional
forgetting for emotional words. The first purpose of our study,
therefore, was to replicate Anderson and Green’s (2001) finding of
below-baseline recall of the target words as a function of suppres-
sion training in a group of nondepressed participants. In this
context, our first hypothesis was that nondepressed participants
would exhibit a linear decline in recall rates of the target words as
a function of the number of times they practiced suppressing these
words in the presence of the cue words, and they would exhibit a
linear increase in recall rates of the target words as a function of
the number of times they practiced responding with these words in
the presence of the cue words. We also expected that the nonde-
pressed participants would not exhibit differential recall rates as a
function of the valence of the target words. Our primary interest,
however, was in the effects of the suppression training on de-
pressed participants who were required to respond to neutral cues
by recalling or suppressing negative words that had been paired
with these cues. Specifically, in our second hypothesis, we pro-
641INTENTIONAL FORGETTING IN DEPRESSION
posed that depressed participants who were trained to suppress
negative target words would not exhibit the preferential recall of
negative words that has been found consistently in previous re-
search to be associated with depression, but would exhibit below-
baseline recall of the negative words. Thus, we predicted that
depressed participants would exhibit a linear increase in recall
rates of the negative target words as a function of the number of
times they practiced responding with these words in the presence
of the cue word and a linear decline in recall rates of the negative
target words to below-baseline rates of recall as a function of the
number of times they practiced suppressing these words in the
presence of the cue word.
Method
Overview
The think–no-think task consisted of three separate phases. In the first—
the learning phase—participants studied the neutral cue word–valenced
response word pairs (e.g., “lamp–pain”, “curtain–humor”) and were asked
to memorize them for later recall. At the end of the learning phase,
participants were tested on their knowledge of the cue–response pairs. The
cue words (e.g., lamp, curtain) were presented and the participants were
asked to recall the associated response words (e.g., pain, humor); feedback
was provided. Participants were required to reach the criterion of 50%
correctly recalled response words to move on to the second phase. In the
second phase—the suppression phase—participants were trained either to
suppress the associated words or to respond to the neutral cue words with
the associated words multiple times. Cue words that were presented in
green on the computer screen indicated that the associated response words
should be recalled, and cue words that were presented in red signaled that
the participants should prevent the response words from coming to mind.
The cues were presented either 0, 2, or 12 times. Thus, some of the cues of
the cue–response word pairs that the participants had learned in the first
phase of the task were never presented in the suppression phase. Accord-
ingly, participants never practiced responding with or suppressing the
associated response words. The recall of these response words on the final
test served as the baseline condition. Half of the depressed and half of the
control participants were asked to suppress positive response words in
response to the neutral cues and to respond with negative response words,
whereas the other half of each group were asked to suppress negative
response words and to respond with positive response words. Last, in the
third phase—the final recall test phase—participants were instructed to
recall all response words in response to the cues, regardless of whether they
had practiced recalling or suppressing them.
Participants and Design
Procedure for selection. Volunteers responded to online advertise-
ments concerning information-processing research. These online advertise-
ments are published under “Job Opportunities” on a frequently visited,
easily accessible, Internet page covering the San Francisco area. In our
advertisement, readers were asked whether they were currently experienc-
ing depressed mood for most of the day or had lost pleasure in most of their
daily activities and, if so, whether this had lasted for 2 weeks. In addition,
readers were told that if this described them, they might be eligible to take
part in research examining how people think or process different kinds of
situations. We prescreened respondents over the telephone and then invited
those who met screening criteria (meant to identify potentially diagnosable
depressed individuals and nondepressed controls) to come to the laboratory
for a more extensive interview. Trained interviewers administered the
Structured Clinical Interview (SCID; First, Spitzer, Gibbon, & Williams,
1996) for the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders,
Fourth Edition (DSM–IV; American Psychiatric Association, 1994) to all
participants during their first session in the study. Participants were in-
cluded in the depressed group if they met DSM–IV criteria for major
depressive disorder (MDD). The nondepressed group consisted of individ-
uals with no current diagnosis and no history of any Axis I disorder. Severe
head trauma, color blindness, and learning disabilities excluded individuals
from the study, as did current panic disorder, current social phobia,
psychotic symptoms, bipolar disorder, and alcohol or substance abuse
within the past 6 months. Although we did not exclude all comorbid
disorders in our MDD group, overall comorbidity rates in our final sample
were low. Only 7 of our 36 depressed participants were diagnosed with a
comorbid disorder: 3 with current posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), 1
with past PTSD, 1 with binge eating disorder, 1 with dysthymia, and 1 with
obsessive–compulsive disorder (OCD). Individuals who met the inclusion
criteria were scheduled for a second session of “computer tasks,” typically
conducted within 2 weeks of the interview.
At the end of the first and second sessions, participants completed the
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996). Only
the nondepressed participants who scored below 9.0 on the BDI-II at the
second session were included in the final sample. The mean BDI score was
1.8 in the control group and 27.5 in the MDD group. Within the depressed
and control groups, BDI scores did not differ significantly as a function of
assigned experimental condition ( p  .10 within the depressed group, p 
.50 within the nondepressed group).
Design and final sample. Ninety-one participants (40 participants who
were depressed and 51 nondepressed participants) were administered the
think–no-think task. The data from 4 depressed and 15 nondepressed
participants were excluded because they did not achieve the 50% criterion
during the learning phase. Thus, the final sample consisted of 72 partici-
pants (36 participants who were depressed and 36 nondepressed partici-
pants; 17 men and 55 women). Participants were randomly assigned to
each combination of valence condition (i.e., suppress-positive–respond-
negative; suppress-negative–respond-positive) and the six counterbalanc-
ing conditions, subject to the constraint of equal cell sizes. The participants
in the depressed and nondepressed groups did not differ in age, (M  34.2
years for both groups), or education (69% of depressed and 78% of
nondepressed participants were college graduates), 2[2, N  72]  1.0;
both ps  .05). In addition, distribution according to gender was similar
across conditions. There were 9 male (5 control, 4 MDD) and 27 female
(13 control, 14 MDD) participants in the suppress-positive–respond-
negative condition and 8 male (5 control, 3 MDD) and 28 female (13
control, 15 MDD) participants in the suppress-negative–respond-positive
condition.
Materials
Stimuli. Thirty-six negative, 36 neutral, and 36 positive nouns were
selected from the Affective Norms for English Words (ANEW; Bradley &
Lang, 1999). Words with affective ratings below 4.0 (on a 9-point scale)
were eligible for the negative category, between 4.0 and 6.0 for the neutral
category, and above 6.0 for the positive category. (Respective mean ratings
were 2.3, 5.4, and 7.5.) Other criteria for the word selection included
average word length (negative M  6.1, neutral M  5.5, positive M 
6.2), frequency (negative M 13.7, neutral M 30.9, positive M 20.9),
and arousal (negative M  5.6, neutral M  4.0, positive M  5.4). The
lists of positive and negative words did not differ significantly in word
length, t(70)  1; arousal ratings, t(70)  1.12, p  .05; or word
frequency, t(70)  1.70, p  .05. Because ANEW does not provide
concreteness ratings, 20 Stanford University students were asked to rate
concreteness. We also used the University of South Florida association
norms (Nelson, McEvoy, & Schreiber, 1998) to limit the number of
forward and backward associations within the positive and negative lists
and between the neutral and both emotional lists. Within each valence
group the words were organized into six sets containing six words each,
balanced on mean word length, frequency, arousal, and concreteness (all
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Fs  1). (Fourteen neutral filler words, to constitute seven pairs, were
selected from the same pool and criteria for use in the learning and
suppression phases of the experiment.)
The six sets of neutral words were then paired separately with the six
sets of positive words and the six sets of negative words. Using the
University of Florida association norms, we ensured that there were no
reported forward or backward intrapair associations. Finally, we created
two lists, each of which contained three neutral–negative sets and three
neutral–positive sets (i.e., the neutral nouns in Sets 1–3 were paired with
negative nouns in List 1 and positive nouns in List 2; neutral nouns in Sets
4–6 were paired with positive nouns in List 1 and negative nouns in List
2). Thus, participants learned either negative or positive response words to
the same cue word but learned both negative and positive responses overall
(e.g., trunk disaster, mushroom pillow or trunk breeze, mushroom hostage).
Within each list half—positive or negative response words—the three sets
were rotated systematically across the three conditions of cue presentation
during the suppression phase (0, 2, or 12 cue presentations). Together, this
rotation and the list manipulation comprised six conditions for counterbal-
ancing materials with conditions of the independent variables of response
valence and number of cue presentations.
Questionnaires. At the end of the session, participants completed the
Strategies Questionnaire and the BDI-II. The BDI-II is a reliable and
widely used self-report measure of depressive symptoms (Beck et al.,
1996). It consists of 21 items that assess the levels of depressive symptoms
present in the past 2 weeks. The Strategies Questionnaire was adapted from
a measure used by Anderson (personal communication, May 18, 2002) and
modified by Hertel and Calcaterra (2005). Participants answered each
strategy question on the following scale: 0 (never), 1 (rarely), 2 (some-
times), 3 (frequently), and 4 (very frequently). Participants rated the extent
to which they used each strategy during the suppression phase. The items
concerned whether participants (a) first made sure that they knew the
response word before not thinking about it, (b) made sure they still
remembered the response word after the trial was over, (c) kept repeating
the response word silently while not saying it aloud, (d) kept themselves
from thinking about the response word by thinking about something else,
and (e) kept themselves from thinking about the response word by keeping
their minds completely blank.
Procedure
All tasks were implemented with Superlab Pro software (Cedrus Cor-
poration, San Pedro, CA). The procedure was adapted from Hertel and
Gerstle (2003). The experimental session lasted 60–90 min, and partici-
pants were each paid $25 per hour.
Learning phase. Forty-three word pairs each appeared in black font,
centered on a white computer screen for 5 s. Participants were instructed to
study the word pairs for a later test. The word pairs appeared in a
randomized block order. Each block of six trials contained 1 pair from each
of the six sets. Three of the 7 filler pairs appeared at the beginning of the
list, 3 at the end, and 1 in the middle. At the end of the learning phase, we
administered a feedback test during which participants recalled response
words out loud. Cues appeared on the screen in black font for 5,200 ms (or
less if the response occurred sooner). Immediately following cue offset, the
correct response was displayed in blue font for 2 s. The participants were
told to use the blue feedback to reinforce their knowledge of the word pair.
If they recalled fewer than 50% of the word pairs correctly, we tested their
knowledge again with differently ordered cues. Participants completed up
to four feedback tests to learn the word pairs to 50% criterion to advance
to the suppression phase. If they failed to reach the 50% criterion after four
feedback cycles, they finished the session by completing only the short
suppression training phase, the Strategy Questionnaire, and the BDI-II.
Suppression phase. The main suppression phase (think–no-think) was
preceded by a few trials for practice in carrying out the instructions. In both
the practice and main versions, each trial was preceded by a series of
crosses for 200 ms. Cue words appeared in either red or green font,
centered on a white background. Participants were instructed to avoid
saying or thinking about the response words associated with cue words
appearing in red, which were displayed for 4 s each. Participants were
asked to read and fully comprehend the cue word and to stay focused on the
cue word for the entire 4-s presentation time but to avoid thinking about the
associated response word. The instructions emphasized that it was imper-
ative that participants prevent the response word from coming to mind at
all and that they should not think about the response word while looking at
the cue word, even after the cue word had gone off the screen. If partici-
pants mistakenly responded to a red cue word, the computer displayed a
series of large red Xs. Participants were told to recall out loud the correct
responses to cue words appearing in green font, just as they had done in the
learning phase. Green cue words also were displayed for 4 s (or less if the
response occurred sooner).
During the practice trials, one filler cue word appeared in red eight times
and six filler cue words appeared in green (once or twice each). Immedi-
ately following the offset of green cue words, the computer displayed the
correct response in blue font. Participants were told to use this feedback to
improve their accuracy and speed of responding to green cue words. At the
end of the practice phase, participants completed a questionnaire to ensure
that they understood and had followed the instructions.
The main suppression phase differed from practice trials in one respect:
The blue feedback word was displayed only when participants responded
incorrectly to green cue words. The suppression phase consisted of 244
trials with two filler cues at the beginning and end of the list. The trials
appeared in a randomized block order with six filler cue words each
repeated 12 times (72 trials), six cue words for responding repeated 12
times, six cue words for suppressing repeated 12 times, another six “re-
spond” cue words repeated twice (12 trials), and another six “suppress” cue
words repeated twice.1 The first presentations of the twice-presented cue
words occurred in the first half of the trials. All cue words within sets
presented 12 times occurred before the next random iteration began.
Final recall test. In this phase, participants were instructed to recall all
response words from the learning phase, regardless of whether they had
suppressed or responded to the cue words in the suppression phase. Each
cue word appeared in black font centered on white background for 4 s, or
less if the participant responded sooner. Trial order consisted of four filler




The percentages of response words recalled on the final test
were analyzed by a mixed-design analysis of variance (ANOVA),
with between-subjects factors of group (MDD and control) and the
valence of suppressed–responded responses (suppress-positive–
respond-negative vs. suppress-negative–respond-positive), and
within-subject factors of instruction (suppress vs. respond) and the
number of cue presentations (0, 2, or 12) during the suppression
phase. We evaluated the linear trend across the number of cue
presentations to examine the question of below-baseline suppres-
sion. Below-baseline suppression refers to the decreased rate of
recall of response words that were associated with cues that were
presented 2 or 12 times during the suppression phase compared
with response words that were associated with cues that were
never presented in the suppression phase. We also included coun-
1 Anderson and Green (2001) used 1, 8, and 16 repetitions. We reduced
the number of repetitions to 2 and 12 to shorten the experiment to make it
more reasonable for community volunteers and for the clinical sample.
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terbalancing condition as a between-subjects factor as a strategy
for reducing error variance. Significant main effects and interac-
tions that are qualified by significant higher order interactions are
not reported.
The suppression effect found by Anderson and Green (2001)
and subsequent replications are expressed as the interaction of the
linear component of cue word presentations (baseline vs. 12 pre-
sentations, in this case) with instruction to suppress or respond
during the suppression phase. That significant interaction was
qualified by the three-way interaction with valence, F(1, 48) 
4.54, MSE  190.97, p  .04. Participants were more successful
in forgetting negative words as a function of suppression practice.
(Although diagnostic group did not interact significantly with the
effect, results reported in the next section show that this conclusion
applies mainly to the recall by MDD participants.)
The only other nonqualified significant effect in the overall
analysis was the interaction of diagnostic group and valence, F(1,
48)  6.15, MSE  652.65, p  .02. Overall, the emotional
valence of the response words did not seem to matter for control
participants. The mean percentage of response words recalled was
84% by those who suppressed positive and responded with nega-
tive versus 83% by those who suppressed negative and responded
with positive words. In contrast, MDD participants recalled an
average of 85% of the words if they suppressed positive and
responded with negative words but only 73% if they suppressed
negative and responded with positive words. To show how each
group performed in the full design, we present the group means
separately: control group means in Figure 1 and MDD group
means in Figure 2.2
Nondepressed Control Participants
Our first goal was to examine whether we would be able to
replicate Anderson and Green’s (2001) finding of below-baseline
recall after suppression practice in our control group using our
modified design. Thus, we predicted a significant interaction
within the control group of instruction (to suppress or to respond)
and the number of cue presentations. As shown in Figure 1, this
interaction was significant, F(1, 24)  21.81, MSE  187.11, p 
.001. There were, however, no significant effects within the sup-
pressed items only, F(1, 70)  1, indicating that the nondepressed
controls did not exhibit below-baseline suppression. This outcome
might be considered a failure to replicate conceptually the results
reported by Anderson and Green if we assume that their partici-
pants were also not depressed. A fairer test of a conceptual
replication of Anderson and Green’s results, however, is one that
excludes data from participants who reported having used strate-
gies, indicating that they did not comply with instructions.
Accordingly, we computed a noncompliance score by summing
the ratings for the first three items on the strategy questionnaire.
Then, within each counterbalancing cell, we excluded the data
2 Although our design differs in a number of ways from studies on mood
congruency in depression, we found indications of mood-congruent recall
when comparing depressed and control participants’ recall of unpracticed
words in the respond condition. Whereas the control participants recalled
equal numbers of positive and negative unpracticed words, F(1, 24)  1,
the depressed participants show a trend toward recalling more negative
than positive unpracticed words, F(1, 24)  3.45, p  .08.
Figure 1. Mean percentage of response words recalled by the control
participants as a function of instruction (suppress–respond), valence
(positive–negative), and number of cue presentations. Participants were
instructed to respond to positive and to suppress negative words or vice
versa. Error bars  1 SE. pos  positive; neg  negative.
Figure 2. Mean percentage of response words recalled by the participants
diagnosed with major depressive disorder (MDD) as a function of instruc-
tion (suppress–respond), valence (positive–negative), and number of cue
presentations. Participants were instructed to respond to positive and to
suppress negative words, or vice versa. Error bars  1 SE.
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from the individual with the highest noncompliance score of the
three, and reanalyzed the data from the remaining 24 control
participants (6 counterbalancing conditions  2 valence condi-
tions). As predicted, independent of valence, significant below-
baseline suppression was obtained, F(1, 12)  6.43, MSE 
202.55, p  .03. These means are represented by a dashed line in
Figure 1. The mean noncompliance score was 3.5 for the 12
excluded participants and 1.1 for the remaining 24 participants,
t(34)  5.11, SE  0.47, p  .001. As expected, the noncompli-
ance score was negatively correlated with the size of the suppres-
sion effect (percentage recalled from responded items minus per-
cent recalled from suppressed items), r(34)  –.34, p  .05.
MDD Participants
The primary goal of this study was to examine whether de-
pressed participants who are trained to suppress negative target
words would exhibit below-baseline recall of these words. Thus,
we expected to obtain an interaction of instruction, cue presenta-
tion, and valence. As is apparent in Figure 2, the three-way
interaction of instruction, valence, and the linear component of cue
word presentations (baseline vs. 12 presentations) was significant
for the MDD participants, F(1, 24)  4.79, MSE  194.83, p 
.04.3 Below-baseline recall was clearly obtained by those de-
pressed participants who practiced suppressing negative words,
F(1, 12)  8.17, MSE  185.18, p  .025, but not by those
depressed participants who practiced suppressing positive words,
F(1, 12) 1. In addition, these participants’ baseline recall, almost
identical in the two baseline conditions (suppress vs. respond 0
times), was significantly lower than the baseline recall of MDD
participants who suppressed positive words. In summary, the
MDD participants were not only more successful in forgetting
negative words that they had practiced suppressing, but they were
also less successful in remembering all unpracticed (baseline)
words and equally successful in recalling practiced responses,
regardless of valence.
It is interesting that the MDD participants who practiced sup-
pressing negative words also recalled fewer of them than did the
comparable control participants (Ms  61% vs. 76%, respec-
tively); the two diagnostic groups recalled similar levels of posi-
tive words that they had suppressed (MDD: M  80%; controls:
M  78%). Indeed, the interaction of group and valence within
suppressed responses was significant, F(1, 48)  5.41, MSE 
643.00, p  .03.
Overall, there were no significant differences between depressed
and nondepressed participants in the suppress-positive–respond-
negative condition. However, depressed and nondepressed partic-
ipants in the suppress-negative–respond-positive condition differ-
entially recalled baseline (unpracticed) words, F(1, 24)  5.93,
MSE  625.00, p  .03 (Ms  81% by nondepressed vs. 66% by
depressed participants). Last, compared with their nondepressed
counterparts, these depressed participants also recalled many fewer
negative responses associated with cues presented 12 times during
practice (Ms  54% vs. 74%, respectively), F(1, 24)  12.10,
MSE  308.64, p  .002.
Group Difference in Strategy
Noncompliance. An ANOVA conducted on the noncompli-
ance scores with factors for group and valence yielded a significant
main effect for valence, F(1, 68)  6.15, MSE  3.44, p  .02
(Ms 1.4 in the suppress-negative condition and 2.5 in the
suppress-positive condition). Neither the main effect for group nor
the interaction of valence and group was statistically significant
(both Fs  1).
Substitution and mind-blanking strategies. Similar analyses
were conducted separately on the ratings for Questions 4 (thinking
about a substitute for the original response) and 5 (mind blanking)
of the Strategies Questionnaire. Although the participants reported
that they “rarely” to “sometimes” used mind blanking (M  1.5),
they reported frequent use of thought substitution to keep from
thinking about the response word (M 3.0). No significant effects
were obtained for either item.
Discussion
The primary purpose of the present study was to examine
whether depressed participants can actively and intentionally for-
get negative material. We explicitly instructed depressed and non-
depressed participants to not think about emotional words that they
had previously learned to associate with neutral cue words, and we
gave them multiple occasions to practice suppression. We found
that depressed participants were particularly successful in forget-
ting negative responses. In fact, the depressed participants recalled
negative words that they had suppressed significantly less often
than they recalled negative words in the baseline condition. Fur-
thermore, the more that the depressed participants practiced sup-
pressing the negative items, the fewer items they recalled on the
final test. After controlling for noncompliance with the suppres-
sion instructions, we also found evidence for below-baseline recall
by control participants but to a comparable degree for positive and
negative responses. Thus, this is the first study to replicate the
results reported by Anderson and Green (2001) using emotional
material.
This study is also one of the first to investigate intentional
forgetting of emotional material in depression. So far, in studies
investigating memory in depression, forgetting is considered a
passive process that reflects individual differences in the elabora-
tion of the presented material. Thus, in the majority of these
studies, participants are not explicitly instructed to forget emo-
tional material. In studies examining passive forgetting, depression
is typically associated with better memory for emotionally nega-
tive material, presumably because depressed individuals habitually
attend to and elaborately process negative information. Indeed,
although our design differs in a number of important ways from
mood-congruency paradigms (e.g., learning to criterion, practicing
recall or suppression), control participants recalled equal numbers
of positive and negative unpracticed words in the “respond” con-
dition, whereas the depressed participants showed a trend toward
recalling more negative than positive unpracticed words. Despite
such habits, the clinically depressed participants in the present
study were successful in forgetting negatively valenced words. In
contrast to other studies on memory in depression, we explicitly
3 A similar difference in compliance means was obtained in the group of
MDD participants. The corresponding reanalysis of the data in the sup-
pressed condition revealed below-baseline suppression only for those par-
ticipants who practiced suppressing negative responses, F(1, 6)  7.14,
MSE  162.04, p  .05.
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instructed our participants to stop the retrieval of emotional nouns
and gave them the opportunity to practice suppressing the negative
response words. Depressed participants recalled fewer negative
words than did control participants and fewer than did other
depressed participants who suppressed positive words.
This pattern of results stands in contrast to earlier findings in
studies of directed forgetting. For example, in the only study to
date that has examined directed forgetting for emotional words in
depression, Power et al. (2000) reported that depressed participants
recalled more to-be-forgotten negative than positive words and
showed better recall for to-be-forgotten than for to-be-remembered
negative words. However, Power et al. found this effect only in
one of their three studies, in which participants were asked to make
self-reference judgments about the words. One significant differ-
ence between our study and Power et al.’s investigation, therefore,
is that we did not have participants encode the stimuli self-
referentially. Equally important, the degree to which the directed
forgetting paradigm represents intentional forgetting is question-
able. Whereas the instruction to forget is given only once in
directed forgetting studies, the think–no-think design provides
multiple occasions for practicing suppression in response to cues
previously used to remember. Indeed, the effect of the number of
cue presentations in our results demonstrates that practice is an
important aspect of intentional forgetting.
Our results also differ from those reported by Hertel and Gerstle
(2003), who used a similar think–no-think design. In that study,
dysphoric students recalled more words that they had been in-
structed to forget than did control participants and failed to pro-
duce below-baseline forgetting in response to both positive and
negative cues. Hertel and Gerstle’s method differed from ours in so
many potentially important ways that it is difficult to speculate
about the reasons for the differences in outcomes. Nevertheless,
some of the following differences should be considered in future
research: (a) Hertel and Gerstle’s participants were dysphoric
students, whereas participants in the present study were older and
were carefully diagnosed with MDD. (b) Hertel and Gerstle did not
use a Strategy Questionnaire, so noncompliance with instructions
for suppression cannot be ruled out as occurring in the dysphoric
group, leading to better memory performance. (c) Hertel and
Gerstle’s learning phase involved the self-referential imaging of
items made positive or negative by the adjective. Arguably, for-
getting these self-generated, integrated, and elaborated episodes
might be harder than forgetting the imposed experimental associ-
ations between the unrelated noun pairs used in the present study.
(d) The cue words used in Hertel and Gerstle’s study were emo-
tional in their own right (and the responses to be suppressed were
at least nominally neutral), so any emotional quality of the memory
to be suppressed was always present on each suppression trial. In
the present study, the cue words were neutral and the emotional
quality of the memory was carried by the response to be sup-
pressed, which might have permitted valence differences to
emerge.
Considerable research on intentional thought suppression has
been guided by the notion of ironic control processes (Wegner,
1994), whereby attempting to suppress or push away an unwanted
thought can increase its accessibility, particularly under high cog-
nitive load. Although the results of some of the studies in this area
suggest that thought suppression is counterproductive (Beevers &
Meyer, 2004; Wegner, Erber, & Zanakos, 1993; Wenzlaff &
Wegner, 2000), investigators explicitly examining recall have
found that suppression leads to poorer recall of the suppressed
stimuli (Rassin, 2001; Wegner, Quillian, & Houston, 1996), a
finding consistent with the present data. For the control partici-
pants in our study the finding of below-baseline recall in the
suppression condition was obtained only after taking into account
participants’ differential compliance with the suppression instruc-
tions. This is consistent with Anderson’s (personal communica-
tion, May 18, 2002) findings (see also Hertel & Calcaterra, 2005)
and supports the notion that suppression training is indeed neces-
sary for forgetting. In addition, it also suggests that the outcome of
suppression is difficult to achieve. Moreover, our current design
does not allow us to exclude the possibility that the forgetting
observed after suppression training is due primarily to interference
from substitute words or pictures that participants used to prevent
thinking about the response word. Indeed, Hertel and Calcaterra
recently provided evidence that the use of a self-initiated strategy
of thought substitution can increase the degree of forgetting in the
think–no-think task. Nevertheless, the finding that depressed par-
ticipants can intentionally forget negative material is important and
novel, regardless of whether it is due to the active inhibition of
memory representations or to the interference from substitute
thoughts or images. Future studies might successfully address the
specific mechanisms that underlie the increased forgetting of neg-
ative words in the depressed group.
Two relatively trivial explanations of the present results should
also be considered here. First, the finding that depressed partici-
pants showed no deficit in intentional forgetting is equivalent to
the finding that depressed participants show deficient recall in
general. Therefore, it is important to consider whether the results
were due to a general depression-related deficit in recall (Burt,
Zembar, & Niederehe, 1995). Overall, more nondepressed than
depressed participants were excluded because they did not reach
the criterion in the learning phase. The depressed and nonde-
pressed participants who remained in our sample did not differ in
the number of learning trials required for reaching the criterion
(M  2.1 vs. M  1.9, respectively; t  1.0). In addition, the
depressed and control participants in both valence conditions had
equivalent rates of recall following practice in responding during
the think–no-think phase (although ceiling effects should be sus-
pected after 12 practice opportunities). Most important, however,
are the similar levels of recalling the positive words that the two
groups practiced suppressing. Evidence that deficient recall in
depression was restricted to suppressed negative responses is not
compatible with the notion of a general deficit.
A second explanation involves the materials used in this study.
Whenever items to be recalled differ between valence conditions,
the outcome concerning valence is correlational; we cannot be sure
that differences other than valence are not responsible for differing
results. For example, it is possible in this study that intrapair
associations differed in some unanticipated way. However, any
viable explanation for the present results that involves materials
could not be straightforward, because significant valence differ-
ences were not found in any condition in the control group or in
depressed participants’ recall in the baseline and respond condi-
tions. This pattern of results cannot be explained by a simple
“materials” account. Nevertheless, our conclusions are restricted to
the use of emotional nouns initially learned under conditions that
did not require self-reference. Although mood-congruency effects
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have been found with a variety of tasks, involving both self-
referential and semantic processing, stronger effects have been
reported when depressed participants are required to process the
words self-referentially and when adjectives, rather than nouns, are
presented (for an overview see Matt et al., 1992). Thus, we cannot
rule out the possibility that suppressing words that have been
processed with reference to the self is more difficult for the
depressed than for the nondepressed participants. For this first
study of practiced suppression of emotional words by a clinical
sample, however, it was important to replicate many features of the
method used by Anderson and Green (2001). In that regard, it was
important to ensure that the noun pairs were not related a priori,
and it would be difficult to ask participants to process such pairs
self-referentially. Questions concerning self-referential processing
and memory for adjectives should be addressed in future research.
It is important to note that our results suggest that intentional
forgetting of negative material in depression comes at a cost of
forgetting baseline words, for which the cues were not presented
during the think–no-think phase. Compared with the controls and
with the depressed participants who practiced suppressing positive
words, depressed participants who practiced suppressing negative
words showed significantly poorer recall of the unpracticed base-
line words. This finding might be related to the strategies used by
participants to achieve suppression. Hertel and Calcaterra (2005)
found that intentional forgetting benefits substantially from
thought substitution during the suppression phase. Depressed peo-
ple are particularly prone to rumination, which consists largely of
relational thinking about negative events. And there is some pos-
sibility that depressed persons tend to distract themselves from
unwanted negative thoughts using other negative thoughts
(Wenzlaff, Wegner, & Roper, 1988). Therefore, the suppression of
negative words might be differentially enhanced by thought sub-
stitution in depression. We did not find significant differences in
the reported frequency of thought substitution; instead, participants
in all conditions reported frequent use of this strategy. However,
although we assessed whether the participants used thought sub-
stitution in the suppression phase, we did not assess which alter-
native thoughts they generated and whether they used positive or
negative words to distract themselves from the response word.
This may be an important addition for future research. Thought
substitution merits further exploration in future studies of inten-
tional forgetting, perhaps with methods other than self-report.
Self-reports are often insensitive measures of cognitive phenom-
ena and should be similarly insensitive to the extent of actual
substitution during the earlier suppression phase. In using other
methods, if a greater tendency to substitute other thoughts emerged
in the condition in which the depressed participants’ task was to
suppress negative responses, that tendency might impair recall of
the unpracticed words in a manner analogous to retrieval-induced
forgetting. In retrieval-induced forgetting, practicing the retrieval
of material that competes with unpracticed memories leads to
reduced recall of the unpracticed memories (Anderson & Spell-
man, 1995). Of course, this hypothesis is highly speculative,
because the basis on which the thought substitutes would compete
with the studied items is unclear.
Still, this leaves us with an intriguing question: If depressed
individuals are able to intentionally forget negative material, why
is recurring negative thoughts and negative memories such a
prevalent symptom of this debilitating disorder? Habits of thought
might cause negative thoughts to come to mind, but continued
attention and awareness might be under more intentional control
than we have previously realized (Hertel, 2004). The tendency of
depressed individuals to ruminate about negative information in-
stead of engaging in intentional forgetting may play an important
role in explaining why mood-congruent recall is observed so
reliably in depression. Consistent with this suggestion, Watkins
(2002) argued that rumination is a form of conceptual elaboration
of unpleasant thoughts that leads eventually to enhanced recall, not
only of the encoded material but of related material as well.
Similarly, McFarland and Buehler (1998) found evidence of
mood-congruent recall when participants ruminated in response to
a negative mood induction, but not when they engaged in self-
reflective thinking. It is interesting that Papageorgiou and Wells
(2003) recently emphasized that rumination might be more con-
trollable than previously assumed and that depressed individuals’
metacognitive beliefs about rumination might play an important
role in maintaining their ruminative tendencies. More specifically,
Papageorgiou and Wells suggested that at the same time that
depressed individuals hold positive beliefs about rumination as a
coping strategy, they hold negative beliefs about the uncontrolla-
bility of rumination. Thus, depressed individuals might deliber-
ately engage in rumination in an attempt to solve their problems
but then become overwhelmed by negative thoughts about their
ruminations. The depressive tendency to ruminate instead of to
engage deliberate thought suppression or distraction when con-
fronted with negative events certainly deserves further investiga-
tion (see Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993), as does the
possibility that this tendency can be overcome by training (see
Teasdale et al., 2000). The present results suggest that training
depressed individuals in intentional forgetting could prove to be an
effective strategy to counteract their automatic ruminative
tendencies.
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